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ABSTRACT. When it comes to financial decision-making 
like predicting stock price movements, it would be 
conceivable that rational people had an advantage over 
intuitive people. An experiment was conducted to test this 
hypothesis. Participants of the experiment provided 
repeated estimates for different shares and it was expected 
that rational people would end up with more ‘correct’ 
answers than intuitive people. Additionally, all participants 
of the experiment (N=59) completed a PID scale 
questionnaire (Betsch, 2004; Schunk & Betsch, 2006) to 
evaluate their preferences for deliberate or intuitive 
decision-making. The PID scale provided four categories 
to group people according to their preferences. 
In summary, it was concluded that intuitive people were 
slightly, but not significantly, better with financial decision-
making than were rational people. A higher significance 
was observed from a direct comparison of the four PID 
categories. Predictions of PID-S-plus participants were 
significantly more accurate. 
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Introduction 
 
The effect of intuitive and deliberate approaches to decision making is a field that is of 
interest not only within academia, but also for business and many other fields (like politics, 
prosecutors). In the influential and well perceived book “Heuristics and Biases – The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgement (Gilivich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002) are a few chapters 
that are focused to a large extend on the effects of intuition on decision making (e.g., Tversky, 
& Kahneman, 2002; Tetlock, 2002). However, there are still numerous unanswered questions 
regarding the effects of intuitive and deliberate decision making approaches. In the same book 
you can read a chapter on financial analysts‟ decision making witch concludes with the 
observation that financial analyst are not always rational and ends with the question: “After 
all, are not these practitioners the very same “smart money” that is supposed to keep markets 
rational?” (De Bondt, & Thaler, 2002). In the following years many researchers contributed to 
gain a better understanding on the effects of intuition, conscious analysis and rationality on 
the decision making and forecasting quality (e.g., Acker, 2008; Harteis, & Gruber, 2008; 
Aczel, Lukacs, Komlos, Aitken & others, 2011). Nevertheless, it appears that there are many 
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uncertainties‟ in this field. A particularly vivid example might be the observation that the role 
of intuition in recruiting process of experts and managers is an ongoing discussion in 
academic literature. Taneja & Arora (2015) suggest “the use of reliable and validated tests to 
measure managerial inventiveness”. This paper aims to contribute in this context and presents 
some preliminary results of individual decision-making behaviour from an online experiment. 
The underlying assumption was that in the context of financial decision-making like 
predicting stock price movements, it would be conceivable that rational people had an 
advantage. An experiment was conducted to test this hypothesis. Participants of the 
experiment provided repeated estimates for different shares and it was expected that rational 
people end up with more „correct‟ answers than intuitive people. This experiment was part of 
an online experiment with several groups. The purpose of the overall study was to investigate 
and to understand the group decision-making process of Internet communities that focus on 
stock trading, based on predicting share movements and prices (like Marketocracy or 
sharewise) (Endress, 2015; Endress & Gear, 2013). Several studies have already been 
conducted to assess the quality of the resulting recommendations from financial analysts 
(Bolliger, 2004; Clement, 1999; Fleischer, 2005; Stanzel, 2007) and there is a huge body of 
literature concerning economic forecasting (Elliott & Timmermann, 2013) and company 
valuation (e.g., Damodaran, 2006; Koller & McKinsey and Company, 2010; Ryan, 2007). But 
it is a fact that, by now, these studies show little evidence that it is possible to generate 
predictions that create, in the long run and after transaction costs, profits higher than the 
market average (Malkiel, 2007; Stanzel, 2007). 
 
1. Experiment Design and Data Analysis 
 
The experiment was performed with three lay groups totalling 49 participants, and two 
expert groups totalling ten financial analysts and other stock market professionals. The 
forecasts were benchmarked with actual market prices as well as with each other, over ten e-
Delphi cycles (ten weeks). The field experiment was conducted following an e-Delphi 
(Dalkey & Helmer-Hirschberg, 1962; Lindqvist & Nordänger, 2007) approach. Each e-Delphi 
cycle in this experiment consisted of a first stage for data collection of predictions. Generally, 
these data were compiled and distributed back to the group, but to measure the effect, some 
groups were set up without a feedback loop. In a second round, participants were able to 
provide different responses. The groups of the experiment were purposely selected and 
structured as follows: 
1. Analyst Group (AG) with a group size of 5 participants. 
2. e-Delphi-Group (EDG) with a group size of 21 participants. 
3. Interactive Group (IG) with a group size of 7 participants. 
4. Non-Feedback Group (NFG) with a group size of 21 participants. 
5. Professional Investors Group (PG) with a group size of 5 participants. 
6. Single Expert/ Financial Analyst (Expert). 
The three groups of lay people followed slightly different approaches. The lay people 
e-Delphi-Group (EDG) followed an e-Delphi process (see Figure 1). The interactive group 
followed basically the same process but additionally had the opportunity to communicate with 
the other group members. The third group, the non-feedback group (NFG), also followed the 
same process, but there was no feedback from other group members available to them. These 
settings were supposed to allow a comparison of the influence of group feedback on the 
decision-making process. Preliminary findings of the group results have been presented 
already (e.g., Endress, 2014, 2015; Endress & Gear, 2013). However, the individual decision-
making of the participants was also part of the analysis. An analysis of the individual 
prediction performances compared with the individual characteristics of the participants, as 
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established before the experiment, were planned to identify attributes that might influence 
prediction quality. The results of the experiment suggest that the preference for intuition 
and/or deliberation (PID score) is such an attribute. The analysis presented in this paper is 
focused on the results from the individuals as compared with their corresponding PID scores. 
Both groups, AG and PG; overall ten professionals, were from four different financial 
services companies with offices in Germany. All individuals of the professional groups were 
highly qualified and had access to several professional investment information services (e.g., 
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, industry reports, in-house research material). The first group 
of professionals, the Analyst Group, consisted of five financial analysts with many years of 
industry experience. In the group results of the AG are all the forecasts from the analysts, 
including forecasts for stocks within and outside their professional coverage. The Single 
Expert results are a subset of these forecasts, but only where the expert had active coverage of 
the stock as well. In the AG, all group participants worked as individuals and there were no 
group results or any other feedback provided during the run. The second group of Financial 
Professionals (PG) consisted of investment professionals including portfolio managers, equity 
traders, or salespersons. The PG followed an e-Delphi approach similar to the EDG. 
Undecided voting results – that is, for equal numbers of forecasts for “up” and “down” 
– were excluded. Missing votes from single experts were also excluded. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Group process within one round and between rounds from group as well as actual 
market results (Fr = Friday and Mo = the following Monday). 
 
The market environment during the experiment was diverse. The shares of the 
experiment were selected from four different companies in four different sectors: consumer 
goods (Adidas, Bloomberg code: ADS GY Equity), construction (HeidelbergCement, 
Bloomberg code: HEI GY Equity), utilities (RWE, Bloomberg code: RWE GY Equity), 
technology (Siemens, Bloomberg code: SIE GY Equity), and industry (ThyssenKrupp, 
Bloomberg code: HEI GY Equity). Each participant was asked to provide an estimation of the 
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movement (up or down) over a one-week, one-month, and three-month period for every share 
as well as to enter a stock price prediction (in percent up or down) for a three-month period. 
The different stock also had different price movements during the examination period: while 
some stocks went mostly up (Adidas +36.56%, HeidelbergCement +43.04%) others were 
going down (RWE -12.4%, ThyssenKrupp -8.67%) or showed a sideward tendency and no 
clear direction (Siemens +5.18%). 
 
2. PID Preference Assessment of the Participants 
 
To understand more about the group decision-making process, it might be helpful to 
understand more about the decision-making process of the individual group participants as 
well. In order to gain more understanding of the individual decision-making process, an 
individual assessment of the participants was done for all participants of the experiment. This 
assessment included age, gender, education level, profession, and decision-making type. 
While the questions about age, gender, education level, and profession are quite easy to 
answer, the question about the decision-making type is not easy to address for each 
participant. An approach to address this question was developed by Cornelia Betsch (2004; 
Schunk & Betsch, 2006; Traufetter, 2009). She created and tested a questionnaire (see 
appendix) to determine the preference for intuition and/or deliberation of persons (PID). An 
assessment of all participants was proposed to help to understand the reasons for particular 
predictions and to ensure that the three groups were equally diverse in terms of the assessed 
criteria. 
The following analysis shows the preliminary results from the individual decision-
making of the participants according to their respective PID scores. The PID scale provides 
four categories to group people according to their preferences. There are people with a 
preference for deliberate decisions (PID-D), people with a preference for deliberate intuitive 
(PID-I), and people with situational, varying preferences, whereas people either have a 
preference for both intuitive and deliberate decision-making (PID-S plus) strategies or 
without a preference for any strategy (PID-S minus). 
 
Table 1. Results and Distribution of PID-Scores from the Participants 
 
 AG EDG IG NFG PG ALL 
PID-I 0 5 1 4 1 11 
PID-D 4 6 3 7 2 22 
PID-S plus 1 3 2 3 0 9 
PID-S minus 0 7 1 7 2 17 
Sum 5 21 7 21 5 59 
 
Additionally, it could be observed that within the professional groups, even more PID-
D scores are found. Six of the participating professionals scored as PID-D, two as PID-S 
minus, and only one as PID-I and one as PID-S plus. 
 
3. Comparison of PID-D and PID-I Scores 
 
The overall accuracy of people with a preference for deliberate decision-making was 
50.9% and the overall accuracy of people with a preference for deliberate decision-making 
was 51.5% (see Table 2). Apparently, this is not a very significant difference. This direct 
comparison of PID-D and PID-I prediction quality tested with a Chi-Square test resulted in a 
Chi-square of 0.189 and p-value=0.66. 
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Table 2. Comparison of PID-D and PID-I Scores 
 
 
Participants Correct Wrong Sum 
Percentage of 
correct answers 
PID-D 22 2610 2514 5124 50.9% 
PID-I 11 1320 1245 2565 51.5% 
 
4. Comparison of All Predictions Grouped by PID Scale Score 
 
More interesting than the comparison of PID-I and PID-D scores might be a 
comparison that includes all PID-types and in particular, the result that a preference for both 
intuitive and deliberate decision-making strategies (PID-S plus) leads to significantly better 
predictions (see Table 3). This direct comparison of all four categories' predictions quality 
was tested with a Chi-Square test resulting in a Chi-square of 10.084 and p-value=0.018. 
These results are in a way affirmative of the explanatory scheme from Philip Tetlock (2005) 
and his interpretation of the metaphor of “the hedgehog and the fox.” In his analysis, the 
aggregated success rate of the fox's predictions was considerably better compared with 
hedgehog‟s, and he states that, “Foxes were not especially likely to endorse particular 
substantive positions on rationality, level of analysis, macroeconomics, or foreign policy” 
(Tetlock, 2005, p. 106). Perhaps, it is an advantage for forecasters to apply multiple, i.e., 
deliberate and intuitive, strategies. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of All Predictions Grouped by PID-Scale Score 
 
 
Participants Correct Wrong Sum 
Percentage of 
correct answers 
PID-D 22 2610 2514 5124 50.9% 
PID-I 11 1320 1245 2565 51.5% 
PID-S minus 17 2098 1967 4065 51.6% 
PID-S plus 9 1082 883 1965 55.1% 
 
Synopsis and Conclusion 
 
Following the hypothesis that rational people have an advantage, it would be expected 
that rational people end up with the highest number of correct answers. In summary, it can be 
concluded that this hypothesis is not supported by the data gathered with the experiment. 
However, the data gathered with the experiment indicated that intuitive people might have a 
slight advantage in terms of prediction quality. This means that an inverted version of the 
hypothesis would be correct: Intuitive people are better with financial decision-making 
compared with rational persons. This is supported by the data, although the data are not 
significant in a direct comparison of PID-I and PID-D results at a level of significance of .05. 
A higher significance could be observed for the direct comparison of all four categories. 
Predictions of PID-S-plus participants are apparently of significantly higher accuracy. Still, 
these findings are from an experiment with a limited number of participants and should be 
repeated with a larger sample size and in different settings. Further research might be helpful 
to gain a better understanding of possible limitations and the underlying mechanisms. 
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Appendix 
 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID): An Inventory for Assessing Affect- and 
Cognition-Based Decision-Making 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about your life in general. Your answers should correspond 
to the way you generally make decisions. Circle the number that best represents your opinion. 1 means that you 
very much disagree; 5 means that you very much agree. 
 
Question 
Nr. 
German Version English Translation Preference 
1 
Bevor ich Entscheidungen treffe, denke ich 
meistens erst mal gründlich nach. 
Before making decisions, I first think them 
through. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
2 Ich beobachte sorgfältig meine innersten Gefühle. I listen carefully to my deepest feelings. Preference for 
intuition 
3 
Bevor ich Entscheidungen treffe, denke ich 
meisten erst mal über meine Ziele nach, die ich 
erreichen will. 
Before making decisions, I usually think 
about the goals I want to achieve. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
4 
Bei den meisten Entscheidungen ist es sinnvoll 
sich ganz auf sein Gefühl zu verlassen. 
With most decisions, it makes sense to 
completely rely on your feelings. 
Preference for 
intuition 
5 
Ich mag Situationen nicht, in denen ich mich auf 
meine Intuition verlassen muss. 
I don‟t like situations that require me to 
rely on my intuition. 
Preference for 
intuition 
6 Ich denke über mich nach. I think about myself. Preference for 
deliberation 
7 
Ich schmiede lieber ausgefeilte Pläne, als etwas 
dem Zufall zu überlassen. 
I prefer making detailed plans rather than 
leaving things to chance. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
8 
Ich ziehe Schlussfolgerungen lieber aufgrund 
meiner Gefühle, Menschenkenntnis und 
Lebenserfahrung. 
I prefer drawing conclusions based on my 
feelings, my knowledge of human nature, 
and my experience of life. 
Preference for 
intuition 
9 
Bei meinen Entscheidungen spielen Gefühle eine 
große Rolle. 
My feelings play an important role in my 
decisions. 
Preference for 
intuition 
10 Ich bin perfektionistisch. I am a perfectionist. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
11 
Wenn ich meine Entscheidungen rechtfertigen 
muss, denke ich vorher besonders gründlich nach. 
I think about a decision particularly 
carefully if I have to justify it. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
12 
Wenn es darum geht, ob ich anderen vertrauen 
soll, entscheide ich aus dem Bauch heraus. 
When it comes to trusting people, I can 
usually rely on my gut feelings. 
Preference for 
intuition 
13 
Ich nehme bei einem Problem erst mal die Daten 
und Fakten auseinander, bevor ich mich 
entscheide. 
When I have a problem I first analyse the 
facts and details before I decide. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
14 Ich denke erst nach bevor ich handle. I think before I act. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
15 Ich mag lieber gefühlsbetonte Personen. I prefer emotional people. Preference for 
intuition 
16 
Ich denke über meine Ziele und Pläne stärker 
nach als andere Personen. 
I think more about my plans and goals than 
other people do. 
Preference for 
deliberation 
17 Ich bin ein sehr intuitiver Mensch. I am a very intuitive person. 
Preference for 
intuition 
18 
Ich mag emotionale Situationen, Diskussionen 
und Filme. 
I like emotional situations, discussions, 
and movies. 
Preference for 
intuition 
Note. Inventory for Assessing Affect- and Cognition-Based Decision-Making. Adapted from “Präferenz für 
Intuition und Deliberation (PID) [Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID): An Inventory for Assessing 
Affect- and Cognition-Based Decision-Making]” by C. Betsch, 2004, p. 183. 
